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Organic Poise? Capitalism as Law 
CHRISTOPHER TOMLINS † 
The commonplace according to which we are all thoroughly 
grounded in a particular, contingent lifeworld, so that all 
universality is irreducibly coloured by and embedded in that 
lifeworld, needs to be turned round. The authentic moment of 
discovery, the breakthrough, occurs when a properly universal 
dimension explodes from within a particular context and becomes 
“for-itself,” and is directly experienced as universal.1 
The and that has characterized multi- and inter-
disciplinary legal scholarship over the last half century2 hides 
a wealth of relational variation in socio-legal theory, from 
instrumentalism through evolutionary functionalism, to 
several distinct varieties of relative autonomy, to current 
predilections for a “mutually constitutive” relationship 
between law and what lies beyond it.3 Unless, however, one 
embraces an entirely reductive or reflexive account of law’s 
relationship to whatever inhabits its beyond—such that law, 
as such, has no separate existence at all—one must accept 
that the and immanent in all forms of relational theorizing 
necessarily identifies law as, to some determinable extent, a 
system, structure, discourse, and/or field of its own, coupled 
with, hence cognitively open to, other such systems—
economy, polity, society—but like them manifesting 
operative closure, which is to say that exogenous stimuli are 
processed according to each system’s own culture, practices, 
  
† University of California Berkeley; Berkeley Law; Jurisprudence and Social 
Policy Program. 
 1. SLAVOJ ŽIŽEK, VIOLENCE 152 (2008). 
 2. See, e.g., Edward L. Rubin, Law And and the Methodology of Law, 1997 
WIS. L. REV. 521. 
 3. See Christopher Tomlins, How Autonomous is Law?, 3 ANN. REV.  L. & SOC. 
SCI., 45-68 (2007); see also Catherine L. Fisk & Robert W. Gordon, Foreword: “Law 
As . . .”: Theory and Method in Legal History, 1 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 519, 520-24 
(2011). 
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optics, language, logic, or code, in a manner sufficiently self-
referential to amount, in the strictest statement of the case, 
to autopoiesis.4 Thinking “from the inside out” underscores 
the distinction between system and environment, hence 
between law and society, law and economy, and so forth.5 
Applying the conjunction, as is not uncommon, to law 
and capitalism,6 the two elements under inspection are made 
to appear phenomenally distinct. Of course they overlap, and 
much historical research has been devoted to charting the 
ways they overlap, when they began to overlap, the extent of 
their interpenetration and so forth. However, the and 
powerfully enforces a requirement that we think of “law” and 
“capitalism” as referencing ontologically distinct phenomena. 
History reinforces the requirement in that history supplies a 
substantial archive of precapitalist (hence noncapitalist) law, 
thus a distinct pedigree for law, an “origin” story of its own, 
a record confirming a separate existence, and a distinct goal. 
In law’s stories of its own distinctiveness, the coin was once 
justice, but as befits a goal that can be as much procedural as 
substantive it is now at least as often technique, or 
technology. In either case, outcomes benefit from its 
presence.7 For its part, capitalism, as befits a coarser 
  
 4. See generally GUNTHER TEUBNER, LAW AS AN AUTOPOIETIC SYSTEM (Zenon 
Bankowski ed., Anne Bankowska & Ruth Adler trans., 1993); Roger Cotterrell, 
Sociological Perspectives on Legal Closure, in CLOSURE OR CRITIQUE 175, 175-93 
(Alan Norrie ed., 1993); Michael King, The ‘Truth’ about Autopoiesis, 20 J. L. & 
SOC’Y 218 (1993); Dimitris Michailakis, Law as an Autopoietic System, 38 ACTA 
SOCIOLOGIA 323 (1995). 
 5.  Hugh Baxter, Niklas Luhmann’s Theory of Autopoietic Legal Systems,         
9 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 167, 168-69, 183 (2013). 
 6. See, e.g., National Deviancy Conference & Conference of Socialist 
Economists, Capitalism and the Rule of Law (Bob Fine et al., eds. 1979); see also 
MICHAEL E. TIGAR WITH MADELEINE R. LEVY, LAW AND THE RISE OF CAPITALISM 
(1977); Richard L. Abel, Capitalism and the Rule of Law: Precondition or 
Contraction?, 15 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 685 (1990); David Abraham, Comment, 
Persistent Facts and Compelling Norms: Liberal Capitalism, Democratic 
Socialism, and the Law, 28 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 939 (1994); Sally Ewing, Formal 
Justice and the Spirit of Capitalism: Max Weber’s Sociology of Law, 21 LAW & 
SOC’Y REV. 487 (1987); William J. Novak, Law and the Social Control of American 
Capitalism, 60 EMORY L.J. 377 (2010); David M. Trubek, Max Weber on Law and 
the Rise of Capitalism, 1972 WIS. L. REV. 720-53. 
 7. In a critique of “what becomes of law and justice in a technical age,” 
Marianne Constable calls law’s relation to justice “the traditional concerns of 
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medium, is driven by price. Life is cheapened (literally) by 
the immanent propensity to truck, barter, and exchange (and 
accumulate) that we take to lie at capitalism’s heart, 
rendered more costly when that propensity is obstructed.8 
The application of systems theory seems to me quite 
appropriate to the determination of relations among different 
operative categories of action in any given society—law, 
economy, and so forth. But “capitalism” is not an operative 
category of action. It is an encompassing, holistic 
characterization of a particular type of society. Thus: 
[c]apitalism is an economic system in which trade, industry, and 
the means of production are largely or entirely privately owned and 
operated for profit. Central characteristics of capitalism include 
capital accumulation, competitive markets and wage labour. In a 
capitalist economy, the parties to a transaction typically determine 
the prices at which they exchange assets, goods, and services.9  
Unlike “economy,” capitalism is both institutionally 
(“capitalist” institutions) and ideationally (“capitalism”) 
specific. All societies have economies. Not all economies are 
capitalist. This means that any posited relationship between 
“law” and “economy” will not be constant across all types of 
society. In a “capitalist” society, or “under capitalism,” law 
may well be operatively distinct from economy, but the type 
of law that is operative is not institutionally or ideologically 
distinct from the type of economy.10 In a capitalist society, law 
  
jurisprudence.” MARIANNE CONSTABLE, JUST SILENCES: THE LIMITS AND 
POSSIBILITIES OF MODERN LAW 111, 175-78 (2005). On law as a “technology of 
public action” for “state control of American capitalism,” see Novak, supra note 6, 
at 378, 391, 404-05.  
 8. See JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 17-31 (Richard H. Cox 
ed., Harlan Davidson, Inc. 1982) (1690); ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE 
NATURE AND CAUSES OF WEALTH OF NATIONS 22-23 (Kathryn Sutherland ed., 
Oxford Univ. Press 1998) (1776). By “literally” I mean that a popular 
representation of free market efficiencies is to reckon them in terms of relatively 
lowered living costs and production costs, hence welfare maximization. See 
BERNARD E. HARCOURT, THE ILLUSION OF FREE MARKETS: PUNISHMENT AND THE 
MYTH OF NATURAL ORDER 121-50 (2011). 
 9. WIKIPEDIA, Capitalism, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Capitalism (last visited   
Oct. 10, 2015).  
 10. Isaac D. Balbus, Commodity Form and Legal Form: An Essay on the 
“Relative Autonomy" of the Law, 11 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 571 (1977); Bob Jessop, On 
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and economy will share with each other the definition 
“capitalist.” Both will have had prior incarnations (a 
precapitalist or noncapitalist economy; precapitalist or 
noncapitalist law) and both may exhibit remnants and 
vestiges of those prior incarnations (England has more 
immediately obvious examples of this than the United States: 
think, for example, of the Lord Chancellor’s wig, or a Trade 
Union banner: both put remnants of precapitalist modes of 
production on display). Both, however, are continuously at 
work either at getting rid of—“reforming”—those remnants 
and vestiges,11 or, alternatively, at rendering them 
cognitively (and operatively) open to the type of society in 
which they find themselves.12  
  
Recent Marxist Theories of Law, the State, and Juridico-Political Ideology, 8 INT’L 
J. SOC. L. 339 (1980); Tomlins, supra note 3, at 52-54. Thus, 
[c]apitalism is a social system based on the principle of individual rights. 
Politically, it is the system of laissez-faire (freedom). Legally it is a 
system of objective laws (rule of law as opposed to rule of man). 
Economically, when such freedom is applied to the sphere of production 
its result is the free-market. 
HAMID H. KAZEROONY & AGATA STACHOWICZ-STANUSCH, CAPITALISM AND THE 
SOCIAL RELATIONSHIP: AN ORGANIZATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 292 (2014). Note also 
that admired advocates for capitalism profess no distinction in function or ends 
between “law” and “economy.” At least ideologically, the two systems are not 
operatively distinct but entirely conflated: 
The moral justification of capitalism does not lie in the altruist claim 
that it represents the best way to achieve “the common good.” It is true 
that capitalism does—if that catch-phrase has any meaning—but this is 
merely a secondary consequence. The moral justification of capitalism 
lies in the fact that it is the only system consonant with man’s rational 
nature, that it protects man’s survival qua man, and that its ruling 
principle is: justice.  
AYN RAND, What is Capitalism?, in CAPITALISM: THE UNKNOWN IDEAL 20 (1967).  
 11. As Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., put it: 
It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it 
was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the 
grounds upon which it was laid down have vanished long since, and the 
rule simply persists from blind imitation of the past.  
O. W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897). 
 12. Anglophone settler-colonialist societies with capitalist economies have 
taken hesitant steps toward acknowledging indigenous (non-settler) forms of law 
that are characteristically non-capitalist. Does this contradict the argument being 
made? It is noticeable that jurisdictionally indigenous law’s social place is highly 
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So, although the critique of functionalism is correct to 
disparage theories of lock-step operative responsiveness 
between one system (law) and another (economy),13 it is worth 
investigating to what extent, just as “‘medieval law looked, 
smelled, and acted medieval’ . . . capitalist law looks, smells, 
and acts capitalist.”14 This is a task for legal history.15 
“Looks, smells, and acts” conveys not so much function as 
appearance. To use the language of base and superstructure, 
it is superstructure that produces and reproduces base rather 
than the other way round.16 The content of “base” (mode of 
production) is mysterious, absent the communicative efforts 
constantly occurring in “superstructure.”17 If it relies purely 
on its own resources, “base” cannot tell you what it is, or 
where it is, or what it looks like. It cannot reproduce itself 
unaided. If one is going to use architectonic metaphors, for 
that of a foundation (base) determining the design of the 
  
segregated and, simultaneously, both questioned jurisdictionally as “law” at all, 
while pressed to become cognitively (and operatively) open to settler-colonialist 
capitalism. See Shaunnagh Dorsett & Shaun McVeigh, JURISDICTION 98-115 
(2012); Shaun McVeigh, Law as (More or Less) Itself: On Some Not Very Reflective 
Elements of Law, 4 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 475-81 (2014); Mariana Valverde, “The 
Honor of the Crown is at Stake”: Aboriginal Land Claims Litigation and the 
Epistemology of Sovereignty, 1 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 955 (2011).  
 13. The classic critique of legal functionalism remains. Robert W. Gordon, 
Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57 (1984).  
 14. KITTY CALAVITA, INVITATION TO LAW & SOCIETY: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE 
STUDY OF REAL LAW 16-20 (2010) (quoting LAW AND SOCIETY: READINGS ON THE 
SOCIAL STUDY OF LAW 7 (Stewart Macaulay, Lawrence M. Friedman & John 
Stookey eds., 1995)).  
 15. For two earlier attempts of my own, see CHRISTOPHER L. TOMLINS, LAW, 
LABOR, AND IDEOLOGY IN THE EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC xi-xvi, 26-34, 294-97 
(1993); Tomlins, supra note 3. 
 16. See Christopher Tomlins, Toward a Materialist Jurisprudence, in 2 
TRANSFORMATIONS IN AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY: LAW, IDEOLOGY, AND METHODS; 
ESSAYS IN HONOR OF MORTON J. HORWITZ 196, 198-99 (Daniel W. Hamilton & 
Alfred L. Brophy eds., 2010).  
 17.  See Duncan Kennedy, The Role of Law in Economic Thought: Essays on 
the Fetishism of Commodities, 34 AM. U. L. REV. 939, 976-79 (1985); see also PHIL 
WITHINGTON, THE POLITICS OF COMMONWEALTH: CITIZENS AND FREEMEN IN EARLY 
MODERN ENGLAND 11 (2005) (noting that “in addition to their civil and civic 
propensities” the city commonwealths (municipal corporations) of Tudor-Stuart 
England embodied “the communicative basis of community,” which “the 
cartographer John Speed termed ‘commerce’”). 
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(super)structure erected above it let us substitute an exterior 
from which an interior might, indirectly, be apprehended.18 
We look at the outside of the structure, which we can see, and 
imagine what is inside, which we can’t see.19 A capitalist 
society is a society that appears to be capitalist. Appearances 
are manifested in the society’s networks of communications. 
Law is one of the most important of those networks of 
communication, because law is entirely about consequential 
communication: who owns what, who works for whom, what 
an employee is, and so forth.20 Precisely for this reason—and 
for its enchanting capacity to fashion the results as “order, 
civility, justice, empowerment”—capitalism depends upon 
law.21 
The argument is neither ahistorical nor reductive. It is 
not ahistorical because “capitalist law” is, simply, a 
description of that style of law to be found in a capitalist 
  
 18. Warren Montag, The Threat of the Outside: Althusser’s Reflections on Law, 
in ALTHUSSER AND LAW 15, 19 (Laurent de Sutter ed., 2013).  
[Althusser] has precisely upset the order of the base-superstructure 
model and of its hierarchy of being. Law cannot be grasped as an 
emanation of the state which in turn emanates from the mode of 
production in its material existence. . . . [Q]uestions of order and priority 
are nothing more than a sign of a theoretical problem yet to be 
addressed . . . . 
Id. 
 19. Tomlins, supra note 16, at 200-03. 
 20.  Kennedy, supra note 17, at 991-1001; William S. Lewis, Althusser on Laws 
Natural and Juridical, in ALTHUSSER AND LAW, supra note 18, at 33, 40-41. The 
literature on what I am terming “consequential communication” in labor-legal 
history is extensive. For an early example, see JAMES B. ATLESON, VALUES AND 
ASSUMPTIONS IN AMERICAN LABOR LAW (1983). For a recent example, see JEAN-
CHRISTIAN VINEL, THE EMPLOYEE: A POLITICAL HISTORY (2013).  
 21. Jean Comaroff & John L. Comaroff, Millennial Capitalism: First Thoughts 
on a Second Coming, in MILLENNIAL CAPITALISM AND THE CULTURE OF 
NEOLIBERALISM 1, 38-39 (Jean Comaroff & John L Comaroff eds., 2001). We should 
note that the Comaroffs hold law to be a fetish—“a social product, not a prime 
mover in constructing social worlds.” Id at 38. Yet the fetish is extraordinarily 
durable—legality is the ground upon which the “modernist nation-state” came to 
be, an order of dependence greatly intensified by the rise of neoliberal capitalism 
“because of its contractarian conception of human relations, property relations, 
and exchange relations, its commodification of almost everything, and its 
celebration of deregulated private exchange, all of which are heavily invested in 
a culture of legality.” Id. at 39. 
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society.22 Capitalist law and capitalist society are coincident. 
Both express capitalism.23 It is not reductive because 
comprehension of what constitutes a capitalist society is far 
more often to be gained from its law than its economy.24 
For and, then, we can substitute as. Not capitalism and 
law but capitalism as law. Capitalism is unknowable absent 
media of communication that convey its appearances. It is 
inoperable absent instrumentalities that facilitate its 
negotiations. What are the implications of this substitution? 
How do we understand the two terms “capitalism” and “law” 
such that the one may be made an effect of the other: 
capitalism as law? 
Walter Benjamin writes in Capitalism as Religion (his 
title serves as inspiration for my text), “capitalism is not 
merely religiously conditioned, as [Max] Weber thought, but 
rather [is] an essentially religious phenomenon.”25 Benjamin 
thus restates capitalism as in itself religious. It “serves 
essentially to allay the same cares, torments, troubles to 
which in the past the so-called religions offered answers.”26 
But capitalism is a particular kind of religion. Capitalism is 
purely cultic, simply worship; it is ritual unmediated by 
theology. The cult is also ubiquitous, knowing neither 
remission nor alternative (incessant production and 
consumption). Its output and consequence is Schuld 
  
 22. See Justin Desautels-Stein, The Market as a Legal Concept, 60 BUFF. L. 
REV. 387, 393 (2012). 
 23. Montag, supra note 18, at 26-28. 
 24. TOMLINS, supra note 15, at 19-34. 
 25. See generally Walter Benjamin, Capitalism as Religion, in 1 WALTER 
BENJAMIN: SELECTED WRITINGS: 1913-1926, at 288 (Marcus Bullock & Michael W. 
Jennings eds., Rodney Livingstone trans., 1996). Except where otherwise 
indicated, I am using Samuel Weber’s translation of key passages in his Targets 
of Opportunity: On the Militarization of Thinking because I like it better than the 
translation in Selected Writings. See SAMUEL WEBER, TARGETS OF OPPORTUNITY: 
ON THE MILITARIZATION OF THINKING 110 (2005). By identifying capitalism as a 
religion among the “so-called” religions, Benjamin identifies it with 
Christianity—indeed the fragment holds that capitalism developed as a 
“parasite” of Christianity “until it reached the point where Christianity’s history 
is essentially that of its parasite.” Benjamin, supra, at 289. The religion from 
which all “so-called” religions are distinct is Judaism. 
 26. WEBER, supra note 25. 
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(guilt/debt), which it universalizes, extending even to God, 
thus destroying all possibility of redemption, all possibility of 
anything, indeed, apart from itself, which “hold[s] out until 
the end.”27 
As an all-pervasive cult, capitalism replaces the pre-
Reformation phenomenological and theological world with a 
new mode of knowledge, knowledge of die Bilanz (the bottom 
line), that is, knowledge only of itself. That is, it seizes upon 
a specific material practice—commerce’s mode of calculus—
and renders it utterly ubiquitous.28 “All that is conceivable” 
writes Samuel Weber “is continuation of the cult itself.”29 All 
that which appears as alternative to/critique of capitalism—
Freudian psychology, Nietzschean philosophy, Marxist 
socialism—is in fact the cult itself, endlessly intensified. In 
this universalization of itself and its way of thinking, in the 
demolition of all existence, including God, lies capitalism’s 
  
 27. WEBER, supra note 25, at 122. 
 28. It is important to recognize that there is no neutrality to the disenchanted 
“calculability” that, following Max Weber is the peculiar characteristic of the 
modern. See Max Weber, Science as a Vocation, in FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN 
SOCIOLOGY 129, 139-40 (H. H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills eds., trans., 1958). 
Modalities of measurement are material practices. For example, in her work on 
the legal history of money, Christine Desan has emphasized that money is no 
neutral medium of exchange—“independent means of measure in the market”—
but like all measures of quantity is preceded by the specific material practices 
that establish both units of account and quantification per se as a mode of action 
that helps “configure the world it appear[s] merely to measure.” Christine Desan, 
Coin Reconsidered: The Political Alchemy of Commodity Money, 11 THEORETICAL 
INQUIRIES L. 361, 361 (2010). In the case of money, what is prior to it, setting the 
conditions of existence on which it is established as medium of exchange and 
measurement, is the mode of its creation. See CHRISTINE DESAN, MAKING MONEY: 
COIN, CURRENCY, AND THE COMING OF CAPITALISM (2014); Christine Desan, Beyond 
Commodification: Contract and the Credit-Based World of Modern Capitalism, in 
2 TRANSFORMATIONS IN AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY, supra note 16, at 111, 111-42; 
Desan, Coin Reconsidered, supra; Christine Desan, The Market as a Matter of 
Money: Denaturalizing Economic Currency in American Constitutional History, 
30 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 1 (2005); see also Wendy Nelson Espeland & Berit Irene 
Vannebo, Accountability, Quantification, and Law, 3 ANN. REV. L. SOC. SCI. 21, 
22, 38-41 (2007); Wendy Nelson Espeland & Mitchell L. Stevens, 
Commensuration as a Social Process, 24 ANN. REV. SOC. 313, 313 (1998). See 
generally MARY POOVEY, A HISTORY OF THE MODERN FACT (1998); MARY POOVEY, 
GENRES OF THE CREDIT ECONOMY: MEDIATING VALUE IN EIGHTEENTH- AND 
NINETEENTH-CENTURY BRITAIN (2008). 
 29. WEBER, supra note 25, at 115. 
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hope for itself: it leaves no alternative.30 Samuel Weber 
comments: 
By translating all phenomena into the quantitative relation of the 
bottom line, [capitalism] “destroys” their qualitative specificity, 
“kills” their immediate self-presence, yet at the same time 
“redeems” them as (commodity) value. From the point of view of 
traditional “dogma,”31 such knowledge is seen as strictly 
destructive, “dissolving” the “natural” connections of phenomena 
with the world. “But for us,” Benjamin writes . . . it is “both 
redeeming and lethal.”32 
Once installed and universalized, commercial calculation 
becomes the link between the faith of the individual 
worshipper and the cult’s “salient trait,” which for Benjamin 
is the interest-bearing function of money.33 This, the capacity 
of money to price itself, hence endlessly generate more of 
itself from itself, and not the production of surplus value, is 
in Benjamin’s text what identifies capitalism.34 “It is possible, 
indeed inevitable,” Samuel Weber continues, “to ‘hold out 
until the end’ once that ‘end’ is determined as the bottom line, 
for each bottom line ends one balance sheet and begins 
another. The process is in principle infinite and yet 
immanent.”35 
Capitalism as Religion is not an explanation but rather 
a cosmology, and as such a forerunner of what Benjamin 
would later call a dialectical image, or dialectics at a 
standstill—“a constellation saturated with tensions.”36 
Nevertheless, it provokes one to ask how capitalism 
  
 30. Id. at 115, 123. In Freud, “what has been repressed, the idea of sin, is 
capital itself, which pays interest on the hell of the unconscious.” Benjamin, supra 
note 25, at 289. In Nietzsche, “the superman is the man who has arrived where 
he is without changing his ways.” Id. In Marx, “the capitalism that refuses to 
change course becomes socialism by means of the simple and compound interest 
that are functions of Schuld.” Id.  
 31. This is a reference to pre-Reformation theology. 
 32. WEBER, supra note 25, at 122. 
 33. Id. at 119-20; see also Judith Grbich, The Problem of Fetish in Law, History 
and Postcolonial Theory, 7 LAW TEXT CULTURE 43, 62-66 (2003). 
 34. WEBER, supra note 25, at 120. 
 35. Id. at 123. As a technicality of accountancy, Weber here confuses “balance 
sheet” and “income statement.” The potency of the metaphor remains clear. 
 36. WALTER BENJAMIN, THE ARCADES PROJECT 475 (1999). 
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undertakes these operations, of translation and installation, 
of destruction and redemption? Capitalism is not an 
anthropomorph. If it is “essentially religious,” even if its 
religiosity is only so-called, should one think of it as a system 
of belief? As a cult, after all, what is decisive is not the “truth” 
of its model of knowledge, its units of account, its 
quantifications and translations, but faith in that model—its 
endless reaffirmation. If so, how is the belief system 
manifested? How is the knowledge of Bilanz communicated 
and generalized? How is faith affirmed? 
We might think of the law that expresses capitalism—
capitalist law—as thought and speech in the language of 
Bilanz forming the nexus between the faith of the worshipper 
and that which is worshipped, the mode of transmission that 
actually does the work of translating, installing, destroying, 
and redeeming, that neutralizes and naturalizes (renders 
“true”) the units of account.37 Benjamin places law in the 
creaturely domain of guilt/debt, which is decisively separate 
from religion in its one true (that is, not “so-called”) sense.38 
“By implication, . . . the cult-religion of capitalism functions 
entirely within the (pagan) juridical order, which it both 
hypostasizes and universalizes . . . .”39 The “it” here is 
ambiguous. Does the cult-religion hypostasize and 
  
 37. “Law provides a rich and diverse language of accountability,” write 
Espeland and Vannebo, and quantification has always been one of 
accountability’s prime techniques. Espeland & Vannebo, supra note 28, at 21-22. 
[Q]uantification is rarely the neutral intervention that we might wish 
for, nor does it always produce disinterested knowledge. . . . Each 
instance of quantification has a particular history; the meanings of 
systems of classification that permit quantification are relative; 
numerical precision and accuracy are not the same thing; quantification 
possesses its own distinctive biases; and “statistics were political before 
they were quantitative.”  
Id. at 39.  
 38. See Benjamin, supra note 25. Throughout Benjamin’s corpus, “true” 
religion—beyond the profane—is the locale of redemption (the completion of all 
history). See, e.g., Theological-Political Fragment, in WALTER BENJAMIN: 
SELECTED WRITINGS, 1935–38, at 305-06 (Howard Eiland & Michael W. Jennings, 
eds., 2002). If it is the hope of the cult of capitalism to “hold out until the end,” it 
is the Kingdom of God that is “from the standpoint of history . . . the terminus 
[Ende].” Id. at 305. 
 39. WEBER, supra note 25, at 116. 
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universalize law? Or does the juridical order hypostasize and 
universalize the cult-religion? To the extent that word gives 
voice to belief, law here seems prior. One can have knowledge 
of the interior only through the exterior appearance that 
renders it knowable. Or in other words it is the surface that 
matters. There is no need to go burrowing for shards of law’s 
servitude to capitalism—examples of law as functionalist 
instrumentality—although obviously one can find examples 
if one wishes to do so.40 Rather, seeing is believing. 
A distinct approach to the foregoing stresses that 
“Capitalism as Religion” is more straightforwardly an 
expression of Benjamin’s long-standing interest in 
commodity fetishism. “Benjamin argues that capitalism is 
perhaps the most extreme of all religious cults founded as it 
is upon a purely psychological relationship to fetishized 
objects. Devoid of doctrine or theology, the cult maintains 
itself solely through the permanent celebration of its rites—
shopping and consumption.”41 This raises the same questions 
as above, but in a somewhat different form: whether the 
fetishization of law so evident as an accompaniment to 
capitalism’s emergence, and even more its maturity, 
identifies law as one more instantiation of capitalism’s 
“purely psychological” relationship to the objects of its 
attention, an object like all those others celebrated in 
ceremonies of veneration and consumption, an object 
capitalism renders so relentlessly ubiquitous that nothing 
that cannot be expressed in law exists; or whether it is law 
that is the hypostasizer and universalizer of capitalism.42 
Duncan Kennedy’s work on commodity fetishism emphasizes 
  
 40. See TOMLINS, supra note 15, at xiv & n.8.  
 41. HOWARD EILAND & MICHAEL W. JENNINGS, WALTER BENJAMIN: A CRITICAL 
LIFE 149 (2014). 
 42. The reader will find the question debated in, for example, P.S. ATIYAH, THE 
RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT (1979); MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW: 1780–1860 (1977); MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW: 1870–1960 (1992); Ritu Birla, Law as 
Economy: Convention, Corporation, Currency, 1 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 1015 (2011); 
Comaroff & Comaroff, supra note 21; Roy Kreitner, Money in the 1890s: The 
Circulation of Politics, Economics, and Law, 1 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 975-1013 
(2011); Christopher Tomlins & John Comaroff, “Law As . . .”: Theory and Practice 
in Legal History, 1 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 1039, 1060-67, 1069, 1073-78 (2011). 
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the latter, hence is in accord with the previous paragraph’s 
attention to law as a language of consequence. But 
simultaneously, Kennedy renders commodity fetishism as 
legally-induced false consciousness. Law’s constitutive 
character in relation to the commodity mode of production 
takes the form of “naturaliz[ing] outcomes that are in fact 
contingent on the peculiar mode of social organization of 
production through commodity ownership.”43 As such, law is 
an agency of cognitive blockage, of “false necessity.”44 The 
false legal consciousness characteristic of commodity 
production “is in an important sense a cause as well as an 
effect of the mode of production. This completes the 
dialectical circle: thought constitutes as well as being 
constituted by the social world it seems merely to reflect.”45 
Both variations are potent for legal historians, but they 
are distinct in their implications for “capitalism as law.” 
Crudely, the choice lies between emphasizing consciousness 
on the one hand, structure on the other. In Kennedy’s case, 
as we have seen, law instantiates a consciousness that (a) 
falsely supposes that value is inherent in commodities rather 
than arising from social decisions about production and 
distribution, and consequently (b) privileges the realization 
of value as a return exclusively to commodities’ “guardians,” 
who recognize each other as “owners of private property” and 
engage in value-realizing market exchanges as such, rather 
than as a return to society.46 The critic’s role is to “break[ ] up 
the ‘law block’ by recognizing the internal incoherence of 
legal doctrine, and the contingent constitutive role of law 
makers at all levels,”47 thereby exposing law’s false necessity. 
In exposing false necessity, the critic reveals the existence of 
opportunities in the legal system for oppressed groups to gain 
concessions.  
  
 43. Kennedy, supra note 17, at 991. 
 44. Id. at 1001. 
 45. Id. at 991-92.  
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at 997-98 n.3 (citing Robert Brenner, Agrarian Class Structure and 
Economic Development in Pre-Industrial Europe, 70 PAST & PRESENT 30-75 
(1976)). 
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These [concessions] are not anomalies or deviations from the inner 
logic of capitalist law, but rather an inflection of the course of a 
moving project. They destroy the “symmetry” or “coherence” of law 
only for those on the right and the left who start with a mistaken 
conception of how legality works. There is neither a built-in limit to 
how far concessions can go, nor an inevitable process of unraveling 
if they go too far.48  
Law is thus on the one hand deeply implicated in capitalism, 
but on the other not necessarily so. For those who know “how 
legality works,” law can be made to yield potentially 
unlimited, hence utterly transformative, concessions for 
oppressed groups. 
Benjamin seems to me headed in a different direction. 
The cult is not a “purely psychological” phenomenon 
manifested solely in shopping and consumption—its object of 
worship is die Bilanz. Nor is the cult’s persistence a function 
of category error, or of fundamental mistakes in cognition. 
We may encounter capitalism only as transitive effects—
fragmented, particularized, fluid, evanescent—which 
materialize in our plural worlds of experience (economic, 
political, cultural, legal). But capitalism per se is 
intransitive: it exists independently of our awareness of it.49 
As a realm of activity the capitalist mode of production sets 
conditions for the existence of knowledge—including 
knowledge of itself.50  
  
 48. Id.; see G. R. Rubin & David Sugarman, Introduction: Towards a New 
History of Law and Material Society in England 1750-1914, in LAW, ECONOMY AND 
SOCIETY, 1750-1914: ESSAYS IN THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 1-123 (G. R. Rubin 
& David Sugarman eds., 1984); E. P. Thompson, The Moral Economy of the 
English Crowd in the Eighteenth Century, 50 PAST & PRESENT 121 (1971). 
 49. See Christopher Tomlins, Afterword: Constellations of Class in Early North 
America and the Atlantic World, in CLASS MATTERS: EARLY NORTH AMERICA AND 
THE ATLANTIC WORLD 213 (Simon Middleton & Billy G. Smith eds., 2008); 
Christopher Tomlins, Subordination, Authority, Law: Subjects in Labor History, 
47 INT’L LAB. & WORKING CLASS HIST. 56, 78-80 (1995). 
 50. Tomlins, Afterword, supra note 49, at 308 & n.34. (One might propose that 
capitalism sets conditions for the existence of knowledge in a manner analogous 
to astrophysical phenomena that “bend” light by the gravitational pull of their 
presence. First, one cannot observe the totality of the phenomenon, but its 
presence is theorizable by observation of the effect. But second, what one can 
observe must be recognized as a produced effect. From the observation one 
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Most important, commodity fetishism is not false 
consciousness. As Arthur Ripstein puts it, “the problem is not 
that social relations between people seem to be relations 
between things, but that in an important sense they are 
relations between things.”51  
For Marx, Ripstein argues, the world is the product of 
human activity (material practice), and activity comes before 
understanding. People interact with the world in two ways—
naturally in interaction with natural conditions, and socially, 
in interaction with social institutions. Natural interactions 
involve people in their relation to things; that is, in relations 
operating independently of the will of any individual, such 
as, for example, a farmer trying to cope with the weather. In 
contrast, social interactions involve relations between people, 
hence some degree of mutual acknowledgment and 
reciprocation, rather than operating independently of human 
will.  
If knowledge is thought of as the primary mode of human 
interaction with the world, a possible dimension for criticism of 
social systems presents itself: how knowledgeable or error prone 
are people in that social system? But if activity is considered 
primary, a rather different mode of criticism becomes possible. 
Mistaking human institutions for natural forces is the failing 
associated with the virtue of knowledge. Fetishism—being 
confronted by a relation between people as . . . a relation between 
  
constitutes knowledge, but only partial knowledge, for the effects observed can 
never comprise the totality of the phenomenon). 
 51. Arthur Ripstein, Commodity Fetishism, 17 CAN. J. OF PHIL. 733, 738-39 
(1987). Kennedy successfully answers one of Ripstein’s criticisms of the “fetishism 
as false consciousness” approach. Ripstein writes:  
The fact that capitalism engenders illusions, and the manner in which it 
does so, is germane to understanding its workings . . . . Yet in discussing 
commodity fetishism, Marx stresses neither the mechanism of its origin 
nor its ideological role. Instead he describes it in a tone from which the 
reader is expected to recognize that the existence of fetishism is an 
indictment of capitalism.  
Id. at 738. In fingering law and legal consciousness, Kennedy has identified both 
mechanism and ideological role. However, the question of capitalism as 
law/capitalist law remains open so far as effects are concerned. 
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things—is the failing associated with practical involvement in the 
world.52  
The capitalist market is a relation between people, but 
functions radically differently from ordinary social 
interactions, such as language.  
Each individual faces the labor [or product] market in just the way 
[a farmer] faces the weather. The market sets parameters within 
which one must operate. And the only way to turn those parameters 
to one’s advantage is the same as the only way to turn the weather 
to one’s advantage – by exploiting their very inexorability.53  
One faces the market as one faces a natural force. Knowledge 
that it is not a natural force makes no difference to one’s 
situation: 
The parallel between religious fetishism and commodity fetishism 
should now be clear. Religion arises at the level of thought; so does 
the religious fetish, when people are ruled by the products of their 
minds. Commodity production takes place at the level of practice; 
so does the commodity fetish, when people are ruled by the products 
of their hands. Religion is inseparable from religious fetishism 
because at bottom the institution and the fetish are identical. 
Commodity production and commodity fetishism are inseparable 
because at bottom the market and the fetish are identical. The more 
the market brings nature under human control, the less it is itself 
controllable: “In a word, it creates a world after its own image.”54 
Ripstein’s uncontrollable, unredeemable market potently 
recalls Benjamin’s relentlessly recurrent, endlessly 
expansionist Bilanz.55 Placing activity prior to understanding 
does not relegate law to afterthought. Instead it requires that 
our jurisprudence be materialist in conception.56 Most 
important, Ripstein offers us an alternative reading of 
“capitalism as law” to Kennedy’s contingency—law that is at 
  
 52. Id. at 743 (emphasis added). 
 53. Id. at 746. 
 54. Id. at 748 (citing KARL MARX & FREDERICK ENGELS, MANIFESTO OF THE 
COMMUNIST PARTY 13 (1848). 
 55. For potent illustration, see JONATHAN LEVY, FREAKS OF FORTUNE: THE 
EMERGING WORLD OF CAPITALISM AND RISK IN AMERICA 150-90 (2012). 
 56. See Christopher Tomlins, Historicism and Materiality in Legal Theory, in 
LAW, THEORY, AND HISTORY: A NEGLECTED DIALOGUE (Maksymilian Del Mar & 
Michael Lobban eds., forthcoming July 2016); see also Tomlins, supra note 16.  
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once false necessity, yet always indeterminate, hence also 
potentially transformative. As a social, not a natural, 
relation, the endlessly expanding, uncontrollable capitalist 
market requires human expression. Its expression lies in law, 
just as Kennedy would predict. But the essence of capitalism 
as law is not consciousness but structure. A second look with 
new eyes will not change what one sees.  
To think of law structurally is to imagine a language of 
consequence that produces effects. In a capitalist society the 
effects it produces are manifestations of a system of action 
called capitalism that exists independently of law but is 
knowable only through the operations of law. Perhaps this is 
circular, but I think not.57 Rather, “[w]e cannot draw closed 
the net in which we stand,” as Benjamin writes, intriguingly, 
at the very outset of his fragment.58  
If the argument is not circular then our conclusion might 
be that to study capitalism as law is to study a relationship 
of “organic poise.”59 To study that relationship historically, 
however, also offers the opportunity to identify moments 
when, as Žižek puts it, “in certain specific social conditions of 
commodity exchange and global market economy, 
‘abstraction’ becomes a direct feature of actual social life” 
that “impacts on the way concrete individuals behave and 
relate to their fate and their social surroundings.”60 This 
  
 57. I prefer to think of it as an attempt to rescue “capitalism” as an aggregate 
phenomenon, amenable to examination as such, from the scholarly 
disaggregation that has seen “capitalism” as such replaced by a plurality of ever 
more specified and differentiated phenomena. 
 58. WEBER, supra note 25, at 110-12. The expression suggests a desire to take 
a stand, and an awareness both that the footing is difficult and the dimensions of 
the task formidable. For the present, says Benjamin, one must be content with a 
statement rather than a demonstration. Id.  
59. ŽIŽEK, supra note 1, at 50. Organic poise is that condition of being which 
precedes its own disruption, that which is prior to the moment “when individuals 
no longer fully identify the kernel of their being with their particular social 
situation” when they begin to “experience themselves as forever ‘out of joint’” with 
that situation. See Slavoj Žižek, Against Human Rights, 34 NEW LEFT REV. 115 
(2005), http://newleftreview.org/II/34/slavoj-zizek-against-human-rights; see also 
ŽIŽEK, supra note 1. 
 60.  ŽIŽEK, supra note 1, at 149-50. “How and in what specific historical 
conditions does abstract universality itself become “a fact of (social) life?” Žižek 
asks. “This is the point of Marx’s analysis of commodity fetishism: in a society in 
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formulation—the transformative realization in actual social 
life of law as abstraction—would not be palatable for 
Kennedy, to whom abstraction (freedom, justice) must be 
overcome if one is to realize the contingent possibilities for 
change inherent in “how legality works” once the “false 
necessity” both of capitalism’s legal form and of its 
commodity form have been exposed.61 For Žižek, however, it 
is symptomatic of a distinct way of thinking about both 
“organic poise” and how it can be disrupted that is attractive 
here precisely because (a) it allows us to think of capitalism 
as an aggregate phenomenon, and (b) it does not indulge 
concepts of false consciousness. 
Marxists, says Žižek, have long harped on “the gap 
between the ideological appearance of the universal legal 
  
which commodity exchange predominates, individuals in their daily lives relate 
to themselves, as well as to the objects they encounter, as contingent 
embodiments of abstract and universal notions.” Id. When individuals cease to 
identify the reality of their being solely with the specifics of their circumstances, 
universality becomes “for itself” and “individuals experience themselves as 
forever ‘out of joint’ with regard to [their] situation . . . . In a given social 
structure, universality becomes ‘for itself’ . . . in those individuals who lack a 
proper place in it.” Id. On law and the “facts of life,” see TOMLINS, supra note 15, 
at 19-20. 
 61. Kennedy, supra note 17, at 951, 956-57, 991-92, 999-1001. Kennedy argues 
that “the indeterminacy of the internal criteria of legality is great enough as a 
matter of fact so that, for purposes of the kind of social theory Marxists are 
interested in, we must regard the notion of the commodity form as hopelessly 
imprecise.” Id. at 999-1000. He concludes: 
The commodity form in a particular economy is an artifact of a flexible 
human practice of legal adaptation that is adrift in time, so to speak, 
rather than directed along definite lines by guiding 
abstractions. . . . [W]e must be attentive to its particular course, 
accepting its historical contingency when viewed from the point of view 
of the aspiration to science in social theory. And though we may learn to 
understand that course of drift better than we now do, it won’t be through 
the refinement of the notions of property and contract that define the 
commodity regime in the abstract. I conclude that a 
realist/institutionalist understanding of law destabilizes Marx’s notion 
of the commodity mode of production in much the same way that it 
destabilizes the law of value. As I have interpreted it, this understanding 
of law is the enemy, in our understanding of social and economic life, of 
false necessity, in the same way that Marx’s analysis of commodity 
fetishism is the enemy of false necessity. 
Id. at 1000-01. 
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form and the particular interests that effectively sustain it” 
while ignoring “[t]he counter-argument that the form is 
never a ‘mere’ form, but involves a dynamic of its own which 
leaves traces in the materiality of social life.”62 Thus, 
standard Marxist argument treats “the form of universal 
[human] rights, equality, freedom, and democracy” simply as 
“a necessary but illusory expression of its concrete social 
content . . . exploitation and class domination.”63 But the 
counter-argument, that these forms are not mere 
appearances but have a power of their own, is far more 
subversive, for it presses upon “organic poise” an 
“articulation of actual socio-economic relations” that organic 
poise itself abstractly affirms, on behalf of those who have no 
place in it.64 “The mode of appearance of an abstract 
universality, its entering into actual existence, thus produces 
violence: it violently disrupts a preceding organic poise.”65  
The reduction to “mere illusion” of that which can 
represent “a different actuality” is thus something to be 
avoided. “The key moment of any theoretical—and indeed 
ethical, political, and . . . even aesthetic—struggle is the rise 
of universality out of the particular lifeworld.”66 In such 
moments, “abstract universality” becomes “for itself,” affirms 
its form, “not simply external to or above its particular 
context” but “inscribed within it.”67 These are moments of 
plasticity “insofar as individuals no longer fully identify the 
kernel of their being with their particular social situation.”68 
“Capitalism as law,” then, represents a relation of 
organic poise. But capitalism as law, no less than capitalism 
as religion, is a constellation saturated with tensions. 
Universality-for-itself can “perturb[ ] and affect[ ]” the 
  
 62. ŽIŽEK, supra note 1, at 150. 
 63. Id. at 150-51. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 150. 
 66. Id. at 152. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 150-52. 
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constellation from within.69 Its tensions can be exposed, and 
snapped. 
  
 69.  Id. at 152. 
